Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts
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| Autore: |
Amegashie J. Atsu
|
| Titolo: |
Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts
|
| Pubblicazione: | Guelph, Ont., : University of Guelph, Department of Economics, 2008 |
| Descrizione fisica: | 1 electronic text (42 p.) : digital file |
| Disciplina: | 303.6 |
| Soggetto topico: | Social conflict |
| Revenge | |
| Control theory | |
| Decision-making | |
| Deterrence theory | |
| Economic equilibrium | |
| Economics | |
| Eigenvalues and eigenvectors | |
| Equation | |
| Function (mathematics) | |
| Israel | |
| Loss function | |
| Altri autori: |
RunkelMarco <1971->
|
| Note generali: | "March 11, 2008." |
| Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| Nota di contenuto: | Introduction -- A model of revenge in conflicts -- Equilibrium without revenge -- Open-loop equilibrium -- Closed-loop equilibrium -- Discussion of results -- Conclusion -- References. |
| Sommario/riassunto: | The authors consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. This paper demonstrates that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of conflicts. |
| Titolo autorizzato: | Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts |
| Formato: | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
| Record Nr.: | 9910219786703321 |
| Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
| Opac: | Controlla la disponibilità qui |
Serie:
Working paper (University of Guelph. Dept. of Economics) ; ; 2008-5.