{"text_format":"2","workbook":"xls","n_sheets":1,"sheets":["report2"],"not_rendered":{"charts":0,"images":0,"macros":0,"external_links":1,"defined_names":1,"comments":0,"pivot_tables":0},"unopened":[],"bounds":{"document_bytes":16777216,"sheet_cells":100000,"run_cost":"one","rows_first":2000,"rows_last":500,"rows_between":2000,"halvings":0,"cell_chars":16384,"cell_head_chars":4096},"cells_cut":0,"cells_raw":0,"read":"whole","date_system":"1900","formulas":"cached_only"}

{"sheet":"report2","index":0,"n_rows":26,"n_cols":5,"rows_kept":26,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[0,2,0,3],[0,4,0,5],[1,2,1,3],[1,4,1,5],[2,2,2,3],[2,4,2,5],[3,2,3,3],[4,2,4,3],[5,2,5,3],[6,2,6,3],[7,2,7,3],[19,2,19,3],[20,2,20,3],[24,2,24,3]],"flags":["formulas_cached_only"]}
[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910219786703321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Amegashie J. Atsu"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Guelph, Ont., : University of Guelph, Department of Economics, 2008"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 electronic text (42 p.) : digital file"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"Working paper ; ; 2008-5"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"303.6"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Social conflict"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Revenge"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Control theory"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Decision-making"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Deterrence theory"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Economic equilibrium"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Economics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Eigenvalues and eigenvectors"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Equation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Function (mathematics)"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Israel"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Loss function"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","\"March 11, 2008.\""]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Introduction -- A model of revenge in conflicts -- Equilibrium without revenge -- Open-loop equilibrium -- Closed-loop equilibrium -- Discussion of results -- Conclusion -- References."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","The authors consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. This paper demonstrates that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of conflicts."]