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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910219786703321 |
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Autore |
Amegashie J. Atsu |
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Titolo |
Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Guelph, Ont., : University of Guelph, Department of Economics, 2008 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 electronic text (42 p.) : digital file |
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Collana |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Social conflict |
Revenge |
Control theory |
Decision-making |
Deterrence theory |
Economic equilibrium |
Economics |
Eigenvalues and eigenvectors |
Equation |
Function (mathematics) |
Israel |
Loss function |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Introduction -- A model of revenge in conflicts -- Equilibrium without revenge -- Open-loop equilibrium -- Closed-loop equilibrium -- Discussion of results -- Conclusion -- References. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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The authors consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. This paper demonstrates that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of conflicts. |
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