02552nam 2200697 a 450 991021978670332120230114013539(CKB)3360000000353292(CaOOCEL)215290(CaBNVSL)gtp00532928(OCoLC)311305009(VaAlCD)20.500.12592/5bcs9q(EXLCZ)993360000000353292215290CaOOCEL(Public Documents)20080209d2008 uy 0engurcn||||||n||Paradoxes of Revenge in ConflictsGuelph, Ont. University of Guelph, Department of Economics20081 electronic text (42 p.) digital fileWorking paper ;2008-5"March 11, 2008."Includes bibliographical references.Introduction -- A model of revenge in conflicts -- Equilibrium without revenge -- Open-loop equilibrium -- Closed-loop equilibrium -- Discussion of results -- Conclusion -- References.The authors consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. This paper demonstrates that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of conflicts.Working paper (University of Guelph. Dept. of Economics) ;2008-5.Social conflictRevengeControl theoryIptcncDecision-makingIptcncDeterrence theoryIptcncEconomic equilibriumIptcncEconomicsIptcncEigenvalues and eigenvectorsIptcncEquationIptcncFunction (mathematics)IptcncIsraelIptcncLoss functionIptcncSocial conflict.Revenge.Control theoryDecision-makingDeterrence theoryEconomic equilibriumEconomicsEigenvalues and eigenvectorsEquationFunction (mathematics)IsraelLoss function303.6Amegashie J. Atsu1450834Runkel Marco1971-747995University of Guelph.Department of Economics.CaBNVSLCaBNVSLVaAlCDJOURNAL9910219786703321Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts3651797UNINA