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035   $a(CKB)3360000000353292
035   $a(CaOOCEL)215290
035   $a(CaBNVSL)gtp00532928
035   $a(OCoLC)311305009
035   $a(VaAlCD)20.500.12592/5bcs9q
035   $a(EXLCZ)993360000000353292
071 60$a215290$bCaOOCEL$q(Public Documents)
100   $a20080209d2008      uy             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurcn||||||n||
200 00$aParadoxes of Revenge in Conflicts
210   $aGuelph, Ont. $cUniversity of Guelph, Department of Economics$d2008
215   $a1 electronic text (42 p.) $cdigital file
225 1 $aWorking paper ;$v2008-5
300   $a"March 11, 2008."
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $aIntroduction -- A model of revenge in conflicts -- Equilibrium without revenge -- Open-loop equilibrium -- Closed-loop equilibrium -- Discussion of results -- Conclusion -- References.
330   $aThe authors consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. This paper demonstrates that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of conflicts.
410  0$aWorking paper (University of Guelph. Dept. of Economics) ;$v2008-5.
606   $aSocial conflict
606   $aRevenge
606   $aControl theory$2Iptcnc
606   $aDecision-making$2Iptcnc
606   $aDeterrence theory$2Iptcnc
606   $aEconomic equilibrium$2Iptcnc
606   $aEconomics$2Iptcnc
606   $aEigenvalues and eigenvectors$2Iptcnc
606   $aEquation$2Iptcnc
606   $aFunction (mathematics)$2Iptcnc
606   $aIsrael$2Iptcnc
606   $aLoss function$2Iptcnc
615  0$aSocial conflict.
615  0$aRevenge.
615  7$aControl theory
615  7$aDecision-making
615  7$aDeterrence theory
615  7$aEconomic equilibrium
615  7$aEconomics
615  7$aEigenvalues and eigenvectors
615  7$aEquation
615  7$aFunction (mathematics)
615  7$aIsrael
615  7$aLoss function
676   $a303.6
700   $aAmegashie$b J. Atsu$01450834
701   $aRunkel$b Marco$f1971-$0747995
712 02$aUniversity of Guelph.$bDepartment of Economics.
801  0$bCaBNVSL
801  1$bCaBNVSL
801  2$bVaAlCD
906   $aJOURNAL
912   $a9910219786703321
996   $aParadoxes of Revenge in Conflicts$93651797
997   $aUNINA