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Nota di contenuto	Introduction -- A model of revenge in conflicts -- Equilibrium without revenge -- Open-loop equilibrium -- Closed-loop equilibrium -- Discussion of results -- Conclusion -- References.
Sommario/riassunto	The authors consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. This paper demonstrates that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of conflicts.