Central bank indepence and macroprudential regulation [[electronic resource] /] / Kenichi Ueda and Fabian Valencia
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| Autore: |
Ueda Kenichi
|
| Titolo: |
Central bank indepence and macroprudential regulation [[electronic resource] /] / Kenichi Ueda and Fabian Valencia
|
| Pubblicazione: | Washington, D. C., : International Monetary Fund, c2012 |
| Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (28 p.) |
| Soggetto topico: | Banks and banking, Central |
| Banks and banking | |
| Soggetto genere / forma: | Electronic books. |
| Altri autori: |
ValenciaFabian
|
| Note generali: | Description based upon print version of record. |
| Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| Nota di contenuto: | Cover; Contents; I: Introduction; II: Model Setup; III: Social Planner Benchmark; IV: Time inconsistency in a dual-mandate central bank; V: Separation of Objectives Achieves Social Optimum; VI: The role of political independence; A: Non-Independent Central Bank and Independent Macro-prudential Regulator; B: Non-Independent Macro-prudential Regulator and Independent Central Bank; VII: Welfare Comparisons; List of Tables; 1 Welfare Loss Across Institutional Arrangements; VIII: Conclusions; References; Appendices; I: Non-Independent Single Authority; II: Distortionary Macro-prudential Regulation |
| Sommario/riassunto: | We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the |
| Titolo autorizzato: | Central bank indepence and macroprudential regulation |
| ISBN: | 1-4755-1163-9 |
| 1-4755-8117-3 | |
| Formato: | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
| Record Nr.: | 9910452795303321 |
| Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
| Opac: | Controlla la disponibilità qui |
Serie:
IMF Working Papers