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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910452795303321 |
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Autore |
Ueda Kenichi |
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Titolo |
Central bank indepence and macroprudential regulation [[electronic resource] /] / Kenichi Ueda and Fabian Valencia |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D. C., : International Monetary Fund, c2012 |
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ISBN |
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1-4755-1163-9 |
1-4755-8117-3 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (28 p.) |
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Collana |
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IMF working paper ; ; WP/12/101 |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Soggetti |
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Banks and banking, Central |
Banks and banking |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover; Contents; I: Introduction; II: Model Setup; III: Social Planner Benchmark; IV: Time inconsistency in a dual-mandate central bank; V: Separation of Objectives Achieves Social Optimum; VI: The role of political independence; A: Non-Independent Central Bank and Independent Macro-prudential Regulator; B: Non-Independent Macro-prudential Regulator and Independent Central Bank; VII: Welfare Comparisons; List of Tables; 1 Welfare Loss Across Institutional Arrangements; VIII: Conclusions; References; Appendices; I: Non-Independent Single Authority; II: Distortionary Macro-prudential Regulation |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the |
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