1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910452795303321

Autore

Ueda Kenichi

Titolo

Central bank indepence and macroprudential regulation [[electronic resource] /] / Kenichi Ueda and Fabian Valencia

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D. C., : International Monetary Fund, c2012

ISBN

1-4755-1163-9

1-4755-8117-3

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (28 p.)

Collana

IMF working paper ; ; WP/12/101

Altri autori (Persone)

ValenciaFabian

Soggetti

Banks and banking, Central

Banks and banking

Electronic books.

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

Cover; Contents; I: Introduction; II: Model Setup; III: Social Planner Benchmark; IV: Time inconsistency in a dual-mandate central bank; V: Separation of Objectives Achieves Social Optimum; VI: The role of political independence; A: Non-Independent Central Bank and Independent Macro-prudential Regulator; B: Non-Independent Macro-prudential Regulator and Independent Central Bank; VII: Welfare Comparisons; List of Tables; 1 Welfare Loss Across Institutional Arrangements; VIII: Conclusions; References; Appendices; I: Non-Independent Single Authority; II: Distortionary Macro-prudential Regulation

Sommario/riassunto

We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the