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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910452795303321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Ueda Kenichi"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Central bank indepence and macroprudential regulation [[electronic resource] /] / Kenichi Ueda and Fabian Valencia"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D. C., : International Monetary Fund, c2012"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-4755-1163-9"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4755-8117-3"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (28 p.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF working paper ; ; WP/12/101"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Banks and banking, Central"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Banks and banking"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Electronic books."]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Description based upon print version of record."]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Cover; Contents; I: Introduction; II: Model Setup; III: Social Planner Benchmark; IV: Time inconsistency in a dual-mandate central bank; V: Separation of Objectives Achieves Social Optimum; VI: The role of political independence; A: Non-Independent Central Bank and Independent Macro-prudential Regulator; B: Non-Independent Macro-prudential Regulator and Independent Central Bank; VII: Welfare Comparisons; List of Tables; 1 Welfare Loss Across Institutional Arrangements; VIII: Conclusions; References; Appendices; I: Non-Independent Single Authority; II: Distortionary Macro-prudential Regulation"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the"]
[null,"2.","Record Nr.",null,"UNISA996695778703316"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Davis"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Short Introduction To The Hebrew Tongve, Being A Translation Of The Learned John Buxtorfius' Epitome Of His Hebrew Grammar : That Those Which Are Ignorant Of The Latine Tongue May Attaine By This English Introduction To The Knowledge And Apprehension Of The Originall Text Of Scripture"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"ProQuest, UMI, 1655"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]