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100   $a20130221d2012      uy             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aCentral bank indepence and macroprudential regulation$b[electronic resource] /$fKenichi Ueda and Fabian Valencia
210   $aWashington, D. C. $cInternational Monetary Fund$dc2012
215   $a1 online resource (28 p.)
225  0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/12/101
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a1-4755-4968-7 
311   $a1-4755-0291-5 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $aCover; Contents; I: Introduction; II: Model Setup; III: Social Planner Benchmark; IV: Time inconsistency in a dual-mandate central bank; V: Separation of Objectives Achieves Social Optimum; VI: The role of political independence; A: Non-Independent Central Bank and Independent Macro-prudential Regulator; B: Non-Independent Macro-prudential Regulator and Independent Central Bank; VII: Welfare Comparisons; List of Tables; 1 Welfare Loss Across Institutional Arrangements; VIII: Conclusions; References; Appendices; I: Non-Independent Single Authority; II: Distortionary Macro-prudential Regulation
330   $aWe consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the
410  0$aIMF Working Papers
606   $aBanks and banking, Central
606   $aBanks and banking
608   $aElectronic books.
615  0$aBanks and banking, Central.
615  0$aBanks and banking.
700   $aUeda$b Kenichi$0865251
701   $aValencia$b Fabian$0910645
712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910452795303321
996   $aCentral bank indepence and macroprudential regulation$92285406
997   $aUNINA