03023nam 2200601Ia 450 991045279530332120200520144314.01-4755-1163-91-4755-8117-3(CKB)2550000000106127(EBL)1606696(SSID)ssj0001101020(PQKBManifestationID)11609134(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001101020(PQKBWorkID)11063694(PQKB)11497081(MiAaPQ)EBC1606696(Au-PeEL)EBL1606696(CaPaEBR)ebr10566297(OCoLC)870244824(EXLCZ)99255000000010612720130221d2012 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrCentral bank indepence and macroprudential regulation[electronic resource] /Kenichi Ueda and Fabian ValenciaWashington, D. C. International Monetary Fundc20121 online resource (28 p.)IMF working paper ;WP/12/101Description based upon print version of record.1-4755-4968-7 1-4755-0291-5 Includes bibliographical references.Cover; Contents; I: Introduction; II: Model Setup; III: Social Planner Benchmark; IV: Time inconsistency in a dual-mandate central bank; V: Separation of Objectives Achieves Social Optimum; VI: The role of political independence; A: Non-Independent Central Bank and Independent Macro-prudential Regulator; B: Non-Independent Macro-prudential Regulator and Independent Central Bank; VII: Welfare Comparisons; List of Tables; 1 Welfare Loss Across Institutional Arrangements; VIII: Conclusions; References; Appendices; I: Non-Independent Single Authority; II: Distortionary Macro-prudential RegulationWe consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when theIMF Working PapersBanks and banking, CentralBanks and bankingElectronic books.Banks and banking, Central.Banks and banking.Ueda Kenichi865251Valencia Fabian910645International Monetary Fund.MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910452795303321Central bank indepence and macroprudential regulation2285406UNINA