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Titolo: |
Algorithmic Game Theory : Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010, Proceedings / / edited by Spyros Kontogiannis, Elias Koutsoupias, Paul Spirakis
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Pubblicazione: | Berlin, Heidelberg : , : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2010 |
Edizione: | 1st ed. 2010. |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (VIII, 359 p. 25 illus.) |
Disciplina: | 003.3 |
Soggetto topico: | Computer simulation |
E-commerce | |
Computers | |
Computers and civilization | |
Numerical analysis | |
Simulation and Modeling | |
e-Commerce/e-business | |
Theory of Computation | |
Models and Principles | |
Computers and Society | |
Numeric Computing | |
Persona (resp. second.): | KontogiannisSpyros |
KoutsoupiasElias | |
SpirakisPaul | |
Note generali: | Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph |
Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
Nota di contenuto: | When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers -- How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard? -- A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets -- Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market -- Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games -- Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics -- Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games -- On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games -- Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games -- On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play -- On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria -- On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games -- A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium -- Responsive Lotteries -- On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users -- Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games -- A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It -- The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements -- Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting -- Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy -- Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations -- On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms -- Braess’s Paradox for Flows over Time -- The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant -- Truthful Fair Division -- No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand -- On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria -- 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties -- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games -- Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games. |
Altri titoli varianti: | SAGT'10 |
Titolo autorizzato: | Algorithmic game theory ![]() |
ISBN: | 1-280-38961-3 |
9786613567536 | |
3-642-16170-7 | |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 996465824403316 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. di Salerno |
Opac: | Controlla la disponibilitĂ qui |