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Record Nr. |
UNISA996465824403316 |
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Titolo |
Algorithmic Game Theory : Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010, Proceedings / / edited by Spyros Kontogiannis, Elias Koutsoupias, Paul Spirakis |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Berlin, Heidelberg : , : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2010 |
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ISBN |
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1-280-38961-3 |
9786613567536 |
3-642-16170-7 |
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Edizione |
[1st ed. 2010.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (VIII, 359 p. 25 illus.) |
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Collana |
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Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI ; ; 6386 |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Computer simulation |
E-commerce |
Computers |
Computers and civilization |
Numerical analysis |
Simulation and Modeling |
e-Commerce/e-business |
Theory of Computation |
Models and Principles |
Computers and Society |
Numeric Computing |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers -- How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard? -- A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets -- Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market -- Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games -- Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics -- Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games -- On Nash-Equilibria of |
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Approximation-Stable Games -- Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games -- On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play -- On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria -- On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games -- A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium -- Responsive Lotteries -- On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users -- Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games -- A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It -- The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements -- Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting -- Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy -- Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations -- On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms -- Braess’s Paradox for Flows over Time -- The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant -- Truthful Fair Division -- No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand -- On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria -- 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties -- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games -- Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games. |
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