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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNISA996465824403316"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Algorithmic Game Theory : Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010, Proceedings / / edited by Spyros Kontogiannis, Elias Koutsoupias, Paul Spirakis"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Berlin, Heidelberg : , : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2010"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-280-38961-3"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786613567536"]
[{"$nulls":4},"3-642-16170-7"]
[null,null,"Edizione",null,"[1st ed. 2010.]"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (VIII, 359 p. 25 illus.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI ; ; 6386"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"003.3"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Computer simulation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"E-commerce"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Computers"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Computers and civilization"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Numerical analysis"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Simulation and Modeling"]
[{"$nulls":4},"e-Commerce/e-business"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Theory of Computation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Models and Principles"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Computers and Society"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Numeric Computing"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph"]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references and index."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers -- How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard? -- A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets -- Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market -- Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games -- Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics -- Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games -- On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games -- Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games -- On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play -- On Learning Algorithms for Nash "]
[{"$nulls":4},"Equilibria -- On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games -- A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium -- Responsive Lotteries -- On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users -- Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games -- A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It -- The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements -- Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting -- Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy -- Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations -- On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms -- Braess’s Paradox for Flows over Time -- The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant -- Truthful Fair Division -- No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand -- On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria -- 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties -- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games -- Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games."]