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Bank Competition, Risk, and Asset Allocations / / John Boyd, Gianni De Nicolo, Abu M. Jalal



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Autore: Boyd John Visualizza persona
Titolo: Bank Competition, Risk, and Asset Allocations / / John Boyd, Gianni De Nicolo, Abu M. Jalal Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009
Edizione: 1st ed.
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (37 p.)
Disciplina: 332.1
Soggetto topico: Banks and banking - Econometric models
Competition - Econometric models
Asset allocation
Risk management
Bank credit
Banking
Banks and Banking
Banks and banking
Banks
Competition
Credit
Depository Institutions
Distressed institutions
Finance
Finance: General
Financial Institutions and Services: General
Financial services industry
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
Industries: Financial Services
Loans
Micro Finance Institutions
Monetary economics
Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
Money and Monetary Policy
Mortgages
Soggetto geografico: United States
Altri autori: De NicoloGianni  
JalalAbu M  
Note generali: "July 2009."
Nota di contenuto: Table of Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; Entrepreneurs; Depositors; Banks; Equilibrium; III. Evidence; A. Measurement of competition; B. Measurement of risk; C. Samples; D. Results for the U.S. Sample; E. Results for the International Sample; IV. Alternative Risk Measures; A. Loan Loss Measures of Risk; B. Actual Failures (or near failures) as the Dependent Variable; V. Conclusion; References; Tables; 1. U.S. Sample; 2. U.S. Sample Regressions; 3. International Sample; 4. International Sample Regressions; 5. U.S. Sample Loan Loss Measures; 6. International Sample Loan Loss Measures
7. International Sample: Proxy Measures of (near) Failure
Sommario/riassunto: We study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks' willingness to lend.
Titolo autorizzato: Bank Competition, Risk, and Asset Allocations  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-7595-2
1-4527-9648-3
1-282-84357-5
1-4518-7290-9
9786612843570
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910828973203321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2009/143