1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910828973203321

Autore

Boyd John

Titolo

Bank Competition, Risk, and Asset Allocations / / John Boyd, Gianni De Nicolo, Abu M. Jalal

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009

ISBN

1-4623-7595-2

1-4527-9648-3

1-282-84357-5

1-4518-7290-9

9786612843570

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (37 p.)

Collana

IMF Working Papers

Altri autori (Persone)

De NicoloGianni

JalalAbu M

Disciplina

332.1

Soggetti

Banks and banking - Econometric models

Competition - Econometric models

Asset allocation

Risk management

Bank credit

Banking

Banks and Banking

Banks and banking

Banks

Competition

Credit

Depository Institutions

Distressed institutions

Finance

Finance: General

Financial Institutions and Services: General

Financial services industry

General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)

Industries: Financial Services

Loans

Micro Finance Institutions

Monetary economics

Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General

Money and Monetary Policy



Mortgages

United States

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

"July 2009."

Nota di contenuto

Table of Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; Entrepreneurs; Depositors; Banks; Equilibrium; III. Evidence; A. Measurement of competition; B. Measurement of risk; C. Samples; D. Results for the U.S. Sample; E. Results for the International Sample; IV. Alternative Risk Measures; A. Loan Loss Measures of Risk; B. Actual Failures (or near failures) as the Dependent Variable; V. Conclusion; References; Tables; 1. U.S. Sample; 2. U.S. Sample Regressions; 3. International Sample; 4. International Sample Regressions; 5. U.S. Sample Loan Loss Measures; 6. International Sample Loan Loss Measures

7. International Sample: Proxy Measures of (near) Failure

Sommario/riassunto

We study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks' willingness to lend.