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200 10$aBank competition, risk, and asset allocations /$fprepared by john H. Boyd, Gianni De Nicolo and Abu M. Jalal
205   $a1st ed.
210   $a[Washington, D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund, Research Dept.$d2009
215   $a1 online resource (37 p.)
225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/143
300   $a"July 2009."
311   $a1-4519-1719-8 
327   $aTable of Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; Entrepreneurs; Depositors; Banks; Equilibrium; III. Evidence; A. Measurement of competition; B. Measurement of risk; C. Samples; D. Results for the U.S. Sample; E. Results for the International Sample; IV. Alternative Risk Measures; A. Loan Loss Measures of Risk; B. Actual Failures (or near failures) as the Dependent Variable; V. Conclusion; References; Tables; 1. U.S. Sample; 2. U.S. Sample Regressions; 3. International Sample; 4. International Sample Regressions; 5. U.S. Sample Loan Loss Measures; 6. International Sample Loan Loss Measures
327   $a7. International Sample: Proxy Measures of (near) Failure
330 3 $aWe study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks' willingness to lend.
410  0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/143.
606   $aBanks and banking$xEconometric models
606   $aCompetition$xEconometric models
606   $aAsset allocation
606   $aRisk management
615  0$aBanks and banking$xEconometric models.
615  0$aCompetition$xEconometric models.
615  0$aAsset allocation.
615  0$aRisk management.
676   $a332.1
700   $aBoyd$b John H$0281840
701   $aDe Nicolo$b Gianni$0375199
701   $aJalal$b Abu M$01630702
712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bResearch Dept.
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910828973203321
996   $aBank competition, risk, and asset allocations$94193047
997   $aUNINA