05507oam 22011774 450 991082897320332120240402051329.01-4623-7595-21-4527-9648-31-282-84357-51-4518-7290-99786612843570(CKB)3170000000055289(EBL)1608342(SSID)ssj0000940061(PQKBManifestationID)11600617(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940061(PQKBWorkID)10947099(PQKB)11354402(OCoLC)712987729(IMF)WPIEE2009143(MiAaPQ)EBC1608342(EXLCZ)99317000000005528920020129d2009 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrBank Competition, Risk, and Asset Allocations /John Boyd, Gianni De Nicolo, Abu M. Jalal1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.1 online resource (37 p.)IMF Working Papers"July 2009."1-4519-1719-8 Table of Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; Entrepreneurs; Depositors; Banks; Equilibrium; III. Evidence; A. Measurement of competition; B. Measurement of risk; C. Samples; D. Results for the U.S. Sample; E. Results for the International Sample; IV. Alternative Risk Measures; A. Loan Loss Measures of Risk; B. Actual Failures (or near failures) as the Dependent Variable; V. Conclusion; References; Tables; 1. U.S. Sample; 2. U.S. Sample Regressions; 3. International Sample; 4. International Sample Regressions; 5. U.S. Sample Loan Loss Measures; 6. International Sample Loan Loss Measures7. International Sample: Proxy Measures of (near) FailureWe study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks' willingness to lend.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/143Banks and bankingEconometric modelsCompetitionEconometric modelsAsset allocationRisk managementBanks and BankingimfFinance: GeneralimfMoney and Monetary PolicyimfIndustries: Financial ServicesimfBanksimfDepository InstitutionsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)imfFinancial Institutions and Services: GeneralimfMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralimfFinanceimfBankingimfMonetary economicsimfLoansimfCompetitionimfDistressed institutionsimfBank creditimfBanks and bankingimfFinancial services industryimfCreditimfUnited StatesimfBanks and bankingEconometric models.CompetitionEconometric models.Asset allocation.Risk management.Banks and BankingFinance: GeneralMoney and Monetary PolicyIndustries: Financial ServicesBanksDepository InstitutionsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)Financial Institutions and Services: GeneralMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralFinanceBankingMonetary economicsLoansCompetitionDistressed institutionsBank creditBanks and bankingFinancial services industryCredit332.1Boyd John341064De Nicolo Gianni375199Jalal Abu M1630702International Monetary Fund.Research Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910828973203321Bank Competition, Risk, and Asset Allocations4049391UNINA