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Autore: |
Pani Marco
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Titolo: |
Hold your nose and vote [[electronic resource] ] : why do some democracies tolerate corruption? / / prepared by Marco Pani
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Pubblicazione: | [Washington D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, 2009 |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (34 p.) |
Soggetto topico: | Political corruption |
Democracy | |
Soggetto genere / forma: | Electronic books. |
Note generali: | Description based upon print version of record. |
Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references. |
Nota di contenuto: | Contents; I. Introduction; II. Relations with Previous Studies; III. A Model of Public Expenditure with Corruption; A. How ministers respond to corruption: honest and corrupt citizens; B. The political response of non-elected citizens; C. The choice between honest and corrupt candidates; IV. Voting on Law Enforcement; A. Law enforcement and policy choice; B. Deciding on law enforcement; V. Conclusions; Appendix: Proofs of Propositions; References |
Sommario/riassunto: | This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distorts the allocation of resources between public and private expenditure, altering the policy preferences of elected and non-elected citizens in opposite directions. The result is a reduction in real public expenditure and, if the median voter's demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic, a tax reduction. In this case, so |
Titolo autorizzato: | Hold your nose and vote ![]() |
ISBN: | 1-4623-3559-4 |
1-4527-5814-X | |
9786612843037 | |
1-4518-7230-5 | |
1-282-84303-6 | |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910464234303321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
Opac: | Controlla la disponibilità qui |