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200 10$aHold your nose and vote$b[electronic resource] $ewhy do some democracies tolerate corruption? /$fprepared by Marco Pani
210   $a[Washington D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund$d2009
215   $a1 online resource (34 p.)
225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/83
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a1-4519-1665-5 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Relations with Previous Studies; III. A Model of Public Expenditure with Corruption; A. How ministers respond to corruption: honest and corrupt citizens; B. The political response of non-elected citizens; C. The choice between honest and corrupt candidates; IV. Voting on Law Enforcement; A. Law enforcement and policy choice; B. Deciding on law enforcement; V. Conclusions; Appendix: Proofs of Propositions; References
330   $aThis paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distorts the allocation of resources between public and private expenditure, altering the policy preferences of elected and non-elected citizens in opposite directions. The result is a reduction in real public expenditure and, if the median voter's demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic, a tax reduction. In this case, so
410  0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/83.
606   $aPolitical corruption
606   $aDemocracy
608   $aElectronic books.
615  0$aPolitical corruption.
615  0$aDemocracy.
700   $aPani$b Marco$0937141
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