02702nam 2200565Ia 450 991046423430332120190521024231.01-4623-3559-41-4527-5814-X97866128430371-4518-7230-51-282-84303-6(CKB)3170000000055216(EBL)1608208(SSID)ssj0001476990(PQKBManifestationID)11914269(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001476990(PQKBWorkID)11449384(PQKB)10384385(OCoLC)503190350(MiAaPQ)EBC1608208(EXLCZ)99317000000005521620041202d2009 uf 0engtxtccrHold your nose and vote[electronic resource] why do some democracies tolerate corruption? /prepared by Marco Pani[Washington D.C.] International Monetary Fund20091 online resource (34 p.)IMF working paper ;WP/09/83Description based upon print version of record.1-4519-1665-5 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. Relations with Previous Studies; III. A Model of Public Expenditure with Corruption; A. How ministers respond to corruption: honest and corrupt citizens; B. The political response of non-elected citizens; C. The choice between honest and corrupt candidates; IV. Voting on Law Enforcement; A. Law enforcement and policy choice; B. Deciding on law enforcement; V. Conclusions; Appendix: Proofs of Propositions; ReferencesThis paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distorts the allocation of resources between public and private expenditure, altering the policy preferences of elected and non-elected citizens in opposite directions. The result is a reduction in real public expenditure and, if the median voter's demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic, a tax reduction. In this case, soIMF working paper ;WP/09/83.Political corruptionDemocracyElectronic books.Political corruption.Democracy.Pani Marco937141MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910464234303321Hold your nose and vote2110736UNINA