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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910464234303321 |
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Autore |
Pani Marco |
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Titolo |
Hold your nose and vote [[electronic resource] ] : why do some democracies tolerate corruption? / / prepared by Marco Pani |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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[Washington D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, 2009 |
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ISBN |
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1-4623-3559-4 |
1-4527-5814-X |
9786612843037 |
1-4518-7230-5 |
1-282-84303-6 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (34 p.) |
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Collana |
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IMF working paper ; ; WP/09/83 |
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Soggetti |
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Political corruption |
Democracy |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Contents; I. Introduction; II. Relations with Previous Studies; III. A Model of Public Expenditure with Corruption; A. How ministers respond to corruption: honest and corrupt citizens; B. The political response of non-elected citizens; C. The choice between honest and corrupt candidates; IV. Voting on Law Enforcement; A. Law enforcement and policy choice; B. Deciding on law enforcement; V. Conclusions; Appendix: Proofs of Propositions; References |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distorts the allocation of resources between public and private expenditure, altering the policy preferences of elected and non-elected citizens in opposite directions. The result is a reduction in real public expenditure and, if the median voter's demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic, a tax reduction. In this case, so |
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