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Timing of International Bailouts / / Se-Jik Kim



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Autore: Kim Se-Jik Visualizza persona
Titolo: Timing of International Bailouts / / Se-Jik Kim Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2004
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (42 p.)
Soggetto topico: Economic assistance
Financial crises
Moral hazard
Finance: General
Financial Risk Management
Production and Operations Management
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
International Lending and Debt Problems
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
Financial Crises
Macroeconomics: Production
Economic & financial crises & disasters
Finance
Macroeconomics
Crisis prevention
Productivity
Lender of last resort
Financial sector policy and analysis
Production
Crisis management
Financial risk management
Industrial productivity
Banks and banking, Central
Soggetto geografico: Argentina
Note generali: Cover title.
"January 2004"--Caption.
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-41).
Nota di contenuto: ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW CRISIS-PREVENTION FACILITY""; ""III. THE BASIC MODEL""; ""IV. LAISSEZ-FAIRE""; ""V. EXISTING CRISIS-LENDING FACILITIES""; ""VI. TIMING-BASED CRISIS-LENDING FACILITY""; ""VII. EXTENSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS""; ""VIII. CONCLUSION""; ""APPENDIX I""; ""APPENDIX II""; ""REFERENCES""
Sommario/riassunto: This paper proposes that international rescue financing should not be provided to a country where a crisis first occurs, but rather to any country that suffers a subsequent crisis. Such a timing-based lending facility can be Pareto-superior to both laissez-faire and existing international crisis lending facilities, when domestic governments have more information on their own economies than does the international lender of last resort. The new facility mitigates moral hazard owing to information asymmetry by not rescuing the first-hit country. At the same time, it limits crisis contagion by rescuing countries in subsequent crises. Even in the presence of common shocks, the timing-based facility can reduce global risks of crisis because it induces countries to undertake greater crisis-prevention efforts so as not to become the first country hit.
Titolo autorizzato: Timing of International Bailouts  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-8945-7
1-4527-5636-8
1-281-09286-X
1-4518-9080-X
9786613775917
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910788518203321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2004/009