05074oam 22011654 450 991078851820332120230617033036.01-4623-8945-71-4527-5636-81-281-09286-X1-4518-9080-X9786613775917(CKB)3360000000440961(EBL)3012568(SSID)ssj0000948674(PQKBManifestationID)11541741(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000948674(PQKBWorkID)10951877(PQKB)11180943(OCoLC)535146986(MiAaPQ)EBC3012568(IMF)WPIEE0092004(EXLCZ)99336000000044096120020129d2004 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrTiming of International Bailouts /Se-Jik KimWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2004.1 online resource (42 p.)IMF Working PapersCover title."January 2004"--Caption.1-4518-4262-7 Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-41).""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW CRISIS-PREVENTION FACILITY""; ""III. THE BASIC MODEL""; ""IV. LAISSEZ-FAIRE""; ""V. EXISTING CRISIS-LENDING FACILITIES""; ""VI. TIMING-BASED CRISIS-LENDING FACILITY""; ""VII. EXTENSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS""; ""VIII. CONCLUSION""; ""APPENDIX I""; ""APPENDIX II""; ""REFERENCES""This paper proposes that international rescue financing should not be provided to a country where a crisis first occurs, but rather to any country that suffers a subsequent crisis. Such a timing-based lending facility can be Pareto-superior to both laissez-faire and existing international crisis lending facilities, when domestic governments have more information on their own economies than does the international lender of last resort. The new facility mitigates moral hazard owing to information asymmetry by not rescuing the first-hit country. At the same time, it limits crisis contagion by rescuing countries in subsequent crises. Even in the presence of common shocks, the timing-based facility can reduce global risks of crisis because it induces countries to undertake greater crisis-prevention efforts so as not to become the first country hit.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2004/009Economic assistanceFinancial crisesMoral hazardFinance: GeneralimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfProduction and Operations ManagementimfInternational Monetary Arrangements and InstitutionsimfInternational Lending and Debt ProblemsimfFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationimfGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationimfFinancial CrisesimfMacroeconomics: ProductionimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfFinanceimfMacroeconomicsimfCrisis preventionimfMoral hazardimfFinancial crisesimfProductivityimfLender of last resortimfFinancial sector policy and analysisimfProductionimfCrisis managementimfFinancial risk managementimfIndustrial productivityimfBanks and banking, CentralimfArgentinaimfEconomic assistance.Financial crises.Moral hazard.Finance: GeneralFinancial Risk ManagementProduction and Operations ManagementInternational Monetary Arrangements and InstitutionsInternational Lending and Debt ProblemsFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationFinancial CrisesMacroeconomics: ProductionEconomic & financial crises & disastersFinanceMacroeconomicsCrisis preventionMoral hazardFinancial crisesProductivityLender of last resortFinancial sector policy and analysisProductionCrisis managementFinancial risk managementIndustrial productivityBanks and banking, CentralKim Se-Jik1558659International Monetary Fund.Research Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910788518203321Timing of International Bailouts3844932UNINA