| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910788518203321 |
|
|
Autore |
Kim Se-Jik |
|
|
Titolo |
Timing of International Bailouts / / Se-Jik Kim |
|
|
|
|
|
Pubbl/distr/stampa |
|
|
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2004 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ISBN |
|
1-4623-8945-7 |
1-4527-5636-8 |
1-281-09286-X |
1-4518-9080-X |
9786613775917 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Descrizione fisica |
|
1 online resource (42 p.) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Collana |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Soggetti |
|
Economic assistance |
Financial crises |
Moral hazard |
Finance: General |
Financial Risk Management |
Production and Operations Management |
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions |
International Lending and Debt Problems |
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation |
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation |
Financial Crises |
Macroeconomics: Production |
Economic & financial crises & disasters |
Finance |
Macroeconomics |
Crisis prevention |
Productivity |
Lender of last resort |
Financial sector policy and analysis |
Production |
Crisis management |
Financial risk management |
Industrial productivity |
Banks and banking, Central |
Argentina |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lingua di pubblicazione |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
|
|
|
|
|
Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
|
|
|
|
|
Note generali |
|
Cover title. |
"January 2004"--Caption. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di bibliografia |
|
Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-41). |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di contenuto |
|
""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW CRISIS-PREVENTION FACILITY""; ""III. THE BASIC MODEL""; ""IV. LAISSEZ-FAIRE""; ""V. EXISTING CRISIS-LENDING FACILITIES""; ""VI. TIMING-BASED CRISIS-LENDING FACILITY""; ""VII. EXTENSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS""; ""VIII. CONCLUSION""; ""APPENDIX I""; ""APPENDIX II""; ""REFERENCES"" |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sommario/riassunto |
|
This paper proposes that international rescue financing should not be provided to a country where a crisis first occurs, but rather to any country that suffers a subsequent crisis. Such a timing-based lending facility can be Pareto-superior to both laissez-faire and existing international crisis lending facilities, when domestic governments have more information on their own economies than does the international lender of last resort. The new facility mitigates moral hazard owing to information asymmetry by not rescuing the first-hit country. At the same time, it limits crisis contagion by rescuing countries in subsequent crises. Even in the presence of common shocks, the timing-based facility can reduce global risks of crisis because it induces countries to undertake greater crisis-prevention efforts so as not to become the first country hit. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |