LEADER 05074oam 22011654 450 001 9910788518203321 005 20230617033036.0 010 $a1-4623-8945-7 010 $a1-4527-5636-8 010 $a1-281-09286-X 010 $a1-4518-9080-X 010 $a9786613775917 035 $a(CKB)3360000000440961 035 $a(EBL)3012568 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000948674 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11541741 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000948674 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10951877 035 $a(PQKB)11180943 035 $a(OCoLC)535146986 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3012568 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE0092004 035 $a(EXLCZ)993360000000440961 100 $a20020129d2004 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aTiming of International Bailouts /$fSe-Jik Kim 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2004. 215 $a1 online resource (42 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $aCover title. 300 $a"January 2004"--Caption. 311 $a1-4518-4262-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 39-41). 327 $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW CRISIS-PREVENTION FACILITY""; ""III. THE BASIC MODEL""; ""IV. LAISSEZ-FAIRE""; ""V. EXISTING CRISIS-LENDING FACILITIES""; ""VI. TIMING-BASED CRISIS-LENDING FACILITY""; ""VII. EXTENSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS""; ""VIII. CONCLUSION""; ""APPENDIX I""; ""APPENDIX II""; ""REFERENCES"" 330 3 $aThis paper proposes that international rescue financing should not be provided to a country where a crisis first occurs, but rather to any country that suffers a subsequent crisis. Such a timing-based lending facility can be Pareto-superior to both laissez-faire and existing international crisis lending facilities, when domestic governments have more information on their own economies than does the international lender of last resort. The new facility mitigates moral hazard owing to information asymmetry by not rescuing the first-hit country. At the same time, it limits crisis contagion by rescuing countries in subsequent crises. Even in the presence of common shocks, the timing-based facility can reduce global risks of crisis because it induces countries to undertake greater crisis-prevention efforts so as not to become the first country hit. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2004/009 606 $aEconomic assistance 606 $aFinancial crises 606 $aMoral hazard 606 $aFinance: General$2imf 606 $aFinancial Risk Management$2imf 606 $aProduction and Operations Management$2imf 606 $aInternational Monetary Arrangements and Institutions$2imf 606 $aInternational Lending and Debt Problems$2imf 606 $aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation$2imf 606 $aGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation$2imf 606 $aFinancial Crises$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics: Production$2imf 606 $aEconomic & financial crises & disasters$2imf 606 $aFinance$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aCrisis prevention$2imf 606 $aMoral hazard$2imf 606 $aFinancial crises$2imf 606 $aProductivity$2imf 606 $aLender of last resort$2imf 606 $aFinancial sector policy and analysis$2imf 606 $aProduction$2imf 606 $aCrisis management$2imf 606 $aFinancial risk management$2imf 606 $aIndustrial productivity$2imf 606 $aBanks and banking, Central$2imf 607 $aArgentina$2imf 615 0$aEconomic assistance. 615 0$aFinancial crises. 615 0$aMoral hazard. 615 7$aFinance: General 615 7$aFinancial Risk Management 615 7$aProduction and Operations Management 615 7$aInternational Monetary Arrangements and Institutions 615 7$aInternational Lending and Debt Problems 615 7$aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation 615 7$aGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation 615 7$aFinancial Crises 615 7$aMacroeconomics: Production 615 7$aEconomic & financial crises & disasters 615 7$aFinance 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aCrisis prevention 615 7$aMoral hazard 615 7$aFinancial crises 615 7$aProductivity 615 7$aLender of last resort 615 7$aFinancial sector policy and analysis 615 7$aProduction 615 7$aCrisis management 615 7$aFinancial risk management 615 7$aIndustrial productivity 615 7$aBanks and banking, Central 700 $aKim$b Se-Jik$01558659 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bResearch Dept. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788518203321 996 $aTiming of International Bailouts$93844932 997 $aUNINA