Consciousness revisited [[electronic resource] ] : materialism without phenomenal concepts / / Michael Tye

• Autore: Tye Michael
• Pubblicazione: Cambridge, MA, : MIT Press, c2009
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (xiv, 229 p.)
• Disciplina: 126
• Soggetto topico: Consciousness; Phenomenology; Materialism
• Note generali: "A Bradford book."
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. [217]-225) and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience : the existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing -- Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles -- Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion -- A closer look at the change blindness hypotheses -- The no-seeum view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism -- The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism.
• Sommario/riassunto: We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? This book looks at this question and much more.
• Titolo autorizzato: Consciousness revisited
• ISBN: 1-282-24013-7; 0-262-25517-0; 9786612240133
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910782856203321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: Representation and mind.