LEADER 04008nam 2200613Ia 450 001 9910782856203321 005 20230721005210.0 010 $a1-282-24013-7 010 $a0-262-25517-0 010 $a9786612240133 035 $a(CKB)1000000000721266 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000128983 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11150081 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000128983 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10069577 035 $a(PQKB)11543172 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0000130984 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3338978 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3338978 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10269470 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL224013 035 $a(OCoLC)310962428 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000721266 100 $a20080714d2009 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aConsciousness revisited$b[electronic resource] $ematerialism without phenomenal concepts /$fMichael Tye 210 $aCambridge, MA $cMIT Press$dc2009 215 $a1 online resource (xiv, 229 p.) 225 1 $aRepresentation and mind 300 $a"A Bradford book." 311 $a0-262-01273-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [217]-225) and index. 327 $aIntroduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience : the existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing -- Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles -- Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion -- A closer look at the change blindness hypotheses -- The no-seeum view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism -- The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism. 330 8 $aWe are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? This book looks at this question and much more. 410 0$aRepresentation and mind. 606 $aConsciousness 606 $aPhenomenology 606 $aMaterialism 615 0$aConsciousness. 615 0$aPhenomenology. 615 0$aMaterialism. 676 $a126 700 $aTye$b Michael$0185623 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910782856203321 996 $aConsciousness revisited$93763219 997 $aUNINA