| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910782856203321 |
|
|
Autore |
Tye Michael |
|
|
Titolo |
Consciousness revisited [[electronic resource] ] : materialism without phenomenal concepts / / Michael Tye |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pubbl/distr/stampa |
|
|
Cambridge, MA, : MIT Press, c2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ISBN |
|
1-282-24013-7 |
0-262-25517-0 |
9786612240133 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Descrizione fisica |
|
1 online resource (xiv, 229 p.) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Collana |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Disciplina |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Soggetti |
|
Consciousness |
Phenomenology |
Materialism |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lingua di pubblicazione |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
|
|
|
|
|
Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
|
|
|
|
|
Note generali |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di bibliografia |
|
Includes bibliographical references (p. [217]-225) and index. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di contenuto |
|
Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience : the existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing -- Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles -- Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion -- A closer look at the change blindness hypotheses -- The no-seeum view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism -- The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sommario/riassunto |
|
We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? This book looks at this question and much more. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |