04008nam 2200613Ia 450 991078285620332120230721005210.01-282-24013-70-262-25517-09786612240133(CKB)1000000000721266(SSID)ssj0000128983(PQKBManifestationID)11150081(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000128983(PQKBWorkID)10069577(PQKB)11543172(StDuBDS)EDZ0000130984(MiAaPQ)EBC3338978(Au-PeEL)EBL3338978(CaPaEBR)ebr10269470(CaONFJC)MIL224013(OCoLC)310962428(EXLCZ)99100000000072126620080714d2009 uy 0engur|||||||||||txtccrConsciousness revisited[electronic resource] materialism without phenomenal concepts /Michael TyeCambridge, MA MIT Pressc20091 online resource (xiv, 229 p.)Representation and mind"A Bradford book."0-262-01273-1 Includes bibliographical references (p. [217]-225) and index.Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience : the existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing -- Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles -- Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion -- A closer look at the change blindness hypotheses -- The no-seeum view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism -- The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism.We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? This book looks at this question and much more.Representation and mind.ConsciousnessPhenomenologyMaterialismConsciousness.Phenomenology.Materialism.126Tye Michael185623MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910782856203321Consciousness revisited3763219UNINA