Hold your nose and vote [[electronic resource] ] : why do some democracies tolerate corruption? / / prepared by Marco Pani

• Autore: Pani Marco
• Pubblicazione: [Washington D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, 2009
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (34 p.)
• Soggetto topico: Political corruption; Democracy
• Soggetto genere / forma: Electronic books.
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Nota di contenuto: Contents; I. Introduction; II. Relations with Previous Studies; III. A Model of Public Expenditure with Corruption; A. How ministers respond to corruption: honest and corrupt citizens; B. The political response of non-elected citizens; C. The choice between honest and corrupt candidates; IV. Voting on Law Enforcement; A. Law enforcement and policy choice; B. Deciding on law enforcement; V. Conclusions; Appendix: Proofs of Propositions; References
• Sommario/riassunto: This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distorts the allocation of resources between public and private expenditure, altering the policy preferences of elected and non-elected citizens in opposite directions. The result is a reduction in real public expenditure and, if the median voter's demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic, a tax reduction. In this case, so
• Titolo autorizzato: Hold your nose and vote
• ISBN: 1-4623-3559-4; 1-4527-5814-X; 9786612843037; 1-4518-7230-5; 1-282-84303-6
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910464234303321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: IMF working paper ; ; WP/09/83.