Financial intermediation, competition, and risk [[electronic resource] ] : a general equilibrium exposition / / prepared by Gianni De Nicolo and Marcella Lucchetta

• Autore: De Nicoló Gianni
• Pubblicazione: [Washington D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, 2009
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (31 p.)
• Soggetto topico: Intermediation (Finance); Competition
• Soggetto genere / forma: Electronic books.
• Altri autori: LucchettaMarcella
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Nota di contenuto: Table of Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Basic Model; A. Time, Endowments and Preferences; B. Technologies; C. Contracts and Information; III. Equilibrium with Banks and Depositors; A. Moral Hazard; B. No Moral Hazard; IV. Optimality and Intermediary Rents; V. Equilibrium with Firms, Intermediaries and Depositors; A. The Extended Model; B. Perfectly Correlated Projects; C. Independent Projects; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; References
• Sommario/riassunto: We study a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium. Importantly, they are empirically rele
• Titolo autorizzato: Financial intermediation, competition, and risk
• ISBN: 1-4623-6889-1; 1-4527-8538-4; 1-4518-7252-6; 9786612843204; 1-282-84320-6
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910464014103321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: IMF working paper ; ; WP/09/105.