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010   $a1-4518-7252-6
010   $a9786612843204
010   $a1-282-84320-6
035   $a(CKB)3170000000055261
035   $a(EBL)1608284
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035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940810
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035   $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608284
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100   $a20041202d2009      uf             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurcn|||||||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aFinancial intermediation, competition, and risk$b[electronic resource] $ea general equilibrium exposition /$fprepared by Gianni De Nicolo and Marcella Lucchetta
210   $a[Washington D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund$d2009
215   $a1 online resource (31 p.)
225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/105
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a1-4519-1682-5 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $aTable of Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Basic Model; A. Time, Endowments and Preferences; B. Technologies; C. Contracts and Information; III. Equilibrium with Banks and Depositors; A. Moral Hazard; B. No Moral Hazard; IV. Optimality and Intermediary Rents; V. Equilibrium with Firms, Intermediaries and Depositors; A. The Extended Model; B. Perfectly Correlated Projects; C. Independent Projects; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; References
330   $aWe study a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium. Importantly, they are empirically rele
410  0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/105.
606   $aIntermediation (Finance)
606   $aCompetition
608   $aElectronic books.
615  0$aIntermediation (Finance)
615  0$aCompetition.
700   $aDe Nicolo?$b Gianni$0375199
701   $aLucchetta$b Marcella$0872382
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910464014103321
996   $aFinancial intermediation, competition, and risk$91947656
997   $aUNINA