02848nam 2200589Ia 450 991046401410332120181115204849.01-4623-6889-11-4527-8538-41-4518-7252-697866128432041-282-84320-6(CKB)3170000000055261(EBL)1608284(SSID)ssj0000940810(PQKBManifestationID)11528535(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940810(PQKBWorkID)10955754(PQKB)10049287(OCoLC)645463594(MiAaPQ)EBC1608284(EXLCZ)99317000000005526120041202d2009 uf 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrFinancial intermediation, competition, and risk[electronic resource] a general equilibrium exposition /prepared by Gianni De Nicolo and Marcella Lucchetta[Washington D.C.] International Monetary Fund20091 online resource (31 p.)IMF working paper ;WP/09/105Description based upon print version of record.1-4519-1682-5 Includes bibliographical references.Table of Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Basic Model; A. Time, Endowments and Preferences; B. Technologies; C. Contracts and Information; III. Equilibrium with Banks and Depositors; A. Moral Hazard; B. No Moral Hazard; IV. Optimality and Intermediary Rents; V. Equilibrium with Firms, Intermediaries and Depositors; A. The Extended Model; B. Perfectly Correlated Projects; C. Independent Projects; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; ReferencesWe study a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium. Importantly, they are empirically releIMF working paper ;WP/09/105.Intermediation (Finance)CompetitionElectronic books.Intermediation (Finance)Competition.De Nicoló Gianni375199Lucchetta Marcella872382MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910464014103321Financial intermediation, competition, and risk1947656UNINA