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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910464014103321 |
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Autore |
De NicoloĢ Gianni |
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Titolo |
Financial intermediation, competition, and risk [[electronic resource] ] : a general equilibrium exposition / / prepared by Gianni De Nicolo and Marcella Lucchetta |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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[Washington D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, 2009 |
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ISBN |
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1-4623-6889-1 |
1-4527-8538-4 |
1-4518-7252-6 |
9786612843204 |
1-282-84320-6 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (31 p.) |
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Collana |
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IMF working paper ; ; WP/09/105 |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Soggetti |
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Intermediation (Finance) |
Competition |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Table of Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Basic Model; A. Time, Endowments and Preferences; B. Technologies; C. Contracts and Information; III. Equilibrium with Banks and Depositors; A. Moral Hazard; B. No Moral Hazard; IV. Optimality and Intermediary Rents; V. Equilibrium with Firms, Intermediaries and Depositors; A. The Extended Model; B. Perfectly Correlated Projects; C. Independent Projects; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; References |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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We study a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium. Importantly, they are empirically rele |
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