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Surprise and Deception in the Early War Years, 1940-1942



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Autore: Robert Reuss Colonel Visualizza persona
Titolo: Surprise and Deception in the Early War Years, 1940-1942 Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Bielefeld : , : Pickle Partners Publishing, , 2014
©2014
Edizione: 1st ed.
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (43 p.)
Disciplina: 940.5423
Soggetto topico: Deception (Military science)
Surprise (Military science)
Nota di contenuto: Title page -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- ABSTRACT -- INTRODUCTION -- SURPRISE AND DECEPTION THEORY -- THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF SURPRISE AND DECEPTION -- DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY -- The British -- The Americans -- The Russians -- The Germans -- THE NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN -- Sidi Barrani, 9 December 1940 (Operation Compass) -- Alam Haifa, 31 August 1942 -- Second Alamein, 23 October 1942 (Operation Lightfoot) -- Allied Landings in North Africa , 8 November 1942 (Operation Torch) -- CONCLUSIONS -- BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sommario/riassunto: All opening gambits in WWII were initiated by surprise (Denmark and Norway, France and the Low Countries, Russia and Pearl Harbor). The early war period provides an excellent laboratory for the study of the art of surprise and deception and offers many lessons for today's military planner. Surprise and, to a lesser degree, deception have long been recognized as elements of combat power. This study examines surprise and deception from the perspective of major military operations and campaigns with specific focus on the North Africa Campaign between 1940 and 1942. This was the first active theater of war for the Allies, and surprise and deception were frequently used by both sides. This study examines selected key battles of the North African Campaign, focusing on the achievement of surprise through deception. The scope of this effort includes the doctrinal thinking and development that occurred during the inter-war period and presents theories which show a relationship between that preparation and successes in the Campaign. The author suggests that the lessons learned from this critical period in history are relevant for contemporary military thinking.
Titolo autorizzato: Surprise and Deception in the Early War Years, 1940-1942  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 9781782898153
1782898158
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910163355103321
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