LEADER 03202nam 22005053 450 001 9910163355103321 005 20250731080249.0 010 $a9781782898153 010 $a1782898158 035 $a(CKB)3810000000098077 035 $a(BIP)054487252 035 $a(VLeBooks)9781782898153 035 $a(Perlego)3018594 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC32229551 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL32229551 035 $a(Exl-AI)993810000000098077 035 $a(Exl-AI)32229551 035 $a(OCoLC)1530376355 035 $a(EXLCZ)993810000000098077 100 $a20250731d2014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aSurprise and Deception in the Early War Years, 1940-1942 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aBielefeld :$cPickle Partners Publishing,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014. 215 $a1 online resource (43 p.) 327 $aTitle page -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- ABSTRACT -- INTRODUCTION -- SURPRISE AND DECEPTION THEORY -- THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF SURPRISE AND DECEPTION -- DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY -- The British -- The Americans -- The Russians -- The Germans -- THE NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN -- Sidi Barrani, 9 December 1940 (Operation Compass) -- Alam Haifa, 31 August 1942 -- Second Alamein, 23 October 1942 (Operation Lightfoot) -- Allied Landings in North Africa , 8 November 1942 (Operation Torch) -- CONCLUSIONS -- BIBLIOGRAPHY$7Generated by AI. 330 8 $aAll opening gambits in WWII were initiated by surprise (Denmark and Norway, France and the Low Countries, Russia and Pearl Harbor). The early war period provides an excellent laboratory for the study of the art of surprise and deception and offers many lessons for today's military planner. Surprise and, to a lesser degree, deception have long been recognized as elements of combat power. This study examines surprise and deception from the perspective of major military operations and campaigns with specific focus on the North Africa Campaign between 1940 and 1942. This was the first active theater of war for the Allies, and surprise and deception were frequently used by both sides. This study examines selected key battles of the North African Campaign, focusing on the achievement of surprise through deception. The scope of this effort includes the doctrinal thinking and development that occurred during the inter-war period and presents theories which show a relationship between that preparation and successes in the Campaign. The author suggests that the lessons learned from this critical period in history are relevant for contemporary military thinking. 606 $aDeception (Military science)$7Generated by AI 606 $aSurprise (Military science)$7Generated by AI 615 0$aDeception (Military science) 615 0$aSurprise (Military science) 676 $a940.5423 700 $aRobert Reuss$b Colonel$01835771 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910163355103321 996 $aSurprise and Deception in the Early War Years, 1940-1942$94412733 997 $aUNINA