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Wittgenstein's account of truth / / Sara Ellenbogen



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Autore: Ellenbogen Sara Visualizza persona
Titolo: Wittgenstein's account of truth / / Sara Ellenbogen Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Albany, : State University of New York Press, c2003
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (165 p.)
Disciplina: 121/.091
Soggetto topico: Truth
Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. 137-144) and index.
Nota di contenuto: Intro -- Wittgenstein's Account of Truth -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- PART I: From "Meaning is Use" to the Rejection of Transcendent Truth -- 1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism -- 2. The Positive Account of Truth -- 3. Antirealism Revisited -- PART II: From "Meaning is Use" to Semantic Antirealism -- 4. The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion -- 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism -- 6. Tensions between Wittgenstein and Dummett -- 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent -- PART III: Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- 8. Criteria and Justification Conditions -- 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions -- 10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible -- 11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth -- 12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- Notes -- 1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism -- 2. The Positive Account of Truth -- 3. Antirealism Revisited -- Part II. From "Meaning is Use" to Semantic Antirealism -- 4. The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion -- 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism -- 6. Tensions between Wittgenstein and Dummett -- 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent -- Part III. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- 8. Criteria and Justification Conditions -- 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions -- 10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible -- 11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth -- 12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W.
Sommario/riassunto: Explores the complex nature of truth in Wittgenstein's philosophy.
Titolo autorizzato: Wittgenstein's account of truth  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 9780791487365
0791487369
9781417519330
1417519339
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910966020303321
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