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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910966020303321 |
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Autore |
Ellenbogen Sara |
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Titolo |
Wittgenstein's account of truth / / Sara Ellenbogen |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Albany, : State University of New York Press, c2003 |
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ISBN |
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9780791487365 |
0791487369 |
9781417519330 |
1417519339 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (165 p.) |
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Collana |
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SUNY series in philosophy |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 137-144) and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Intro -- Wittgenstein's Account of Truth -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- PART I: From "Meaning is Use" to the Rejection of Transcendent Truth -- 1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism -- 2. The Positive Account of Truth -- 3. Antirealism Revisited -- PART II: From "Meaning is Use" to Semantic Antirealism -- 4. The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion -- 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism -- 6. Tensions between Wittgenstein and Dummett -- 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent -- PART III: Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- 8. Criteria and Justification Conditions -- 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions -- 10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible -- 11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth -- 12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- Notes -- 1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism -- 2. The Positive Account of Truth -- 3. Antirealism Revisited -- Part II. From "Meaning is Use" to Semantic Antirealism -- 4. The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion -- 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism -- 6. Tensions between Wittgenstein and Dummett -- 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent -- Part III. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- 8. Criteria and Justification Conditions -- 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions -- 10. Why Criteria Are Not |
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