03621nam 2200661Ia 450 991096602030332120200520144314.0978079148736507914873699781417519330141751933910.1515/9780791487365(CKB)111090425035556(OCoLC)61367631(CaPaEBR)ebrary10594746(SSID)ssj0000272942(PQKBManifestationID)11205126(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000272942(PQKBWorkID)10309647(PQKB)10100437(OCoLC)55676247(MdBmJHUP)muse5965(Au-PeEL)EBL3408419(CaPaEBR)ebr10594746(DE-B1597)683677(DE-B1597)9780791487365(MiAaPQ)EBC3408419(Perlego)2673774(EXLCZ)9911109042503555620020423d2003 ub 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrWittgenstein's account of truth /Sara EllenbogenAlbany State University of New York Pressc20031 online resource (165 p.) SUNY series in philosophyBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph9780791456262 0791456269 9780791456255 0791456250 Includes bibliographical references (p. 137-144) and index.Intro -- Wittgenstein's Account of Truth -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- PART I: From "Meaning is Use" to the Rejection of Transcendent Truth -- 1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism -- 2. The Positive Account of Truth -- 3. Antirealism Revisited -- PART II: From "Meaning is Use" to Semantic Antirealism -- 4. The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion -- 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism -- 6. Tensions between Wittgenstein and Dummett -- 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent -- PART III: Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- 8. Criteria and Justification Conditions -- 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions -- 10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible -- 11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth -- 12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- Notes -- 1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism -- 2. The Positive Account of Truth -- 3. Antirealism Revisited -- Part II. From "Meaning is Use" to Semantic Antirealism -- 4. The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion -- 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism -- 6. Tensions between Wittgenstein and Dummett -- 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent -- Part III. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- 8. Criteria and Justification Conditions -- 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions -- 10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible -- 11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth -- 12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W.Explores the complex nature of truth in Wittgenstein's philosophy.TruthTruth.121/.091Ellenbogen Sara1810568MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910966020303321Wittgenstein's account of truth4361959UNINA