Principled agents? [[electronic resource] ] : the political economy of good government / / Timothy Besley

• Autore: Besley Timothy
• Pubblicazione: Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2006
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (279 p.)
• Disciplina: 330; 352.3
• Soggetto topico: Public administration; Government productivity; Agent (Philosophy) - Political aspects; Motivation (Psychology) - Political aspects; Policy sciences
• Soggetto genere / forma: Electronic books.
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. 234-247) and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Contents; Preface; Acknowledgements; 1 Competing views of government; 2 The anatomy of government failure; 3 Political agency and accountability; 4 Political agency and public finance (with Michael Smart); 5 Final Comments; References; Index
• Sommario/riassunto: Mainstream policy economics now pays more attention to the delivery of policy outcomes and how incentives and institutional change shape the effectiveness of government. But should these issues be studied against a background of purely self-interested public servants? There is plenty of evidence that many citizens are publicly spirited. Can their motivation be harnessed in the public interest? These lectures review how economic thought on these issues has evolved. - ;What is good government? Why do some governments fail? How do you implement political accountability in practice? What incentive
• Titolo autorizzato: Principled Agents
• ISBN: 1-280-90468-2; 0-19-153392-0; 1-4294-9179-5
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910452137503321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: Lindahl lectures.