1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910452137503321

Autore

Besley Timothy

Titolo

Principled agents? [[electronic resource] ] : the political economy of good government / / Timothy Besley

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2006

ISBN

1-280-90468-2

0-19-153392-0

1-4294-9179-5

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (279 p.)

Collana

The Lindahl lectures

Disciplina

330

352.3

Soggetti

Public administration

Government productivity

Agent (Philosophy) - Political aspects

Motivation (Psychology) - Political aspects

Policy sciences

Electronic books.

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. 234-247) and index.

Nota di contenuto

Contents; Preface; Acknowledgements; 1 Competing views of government; 2 The anatomy of government failure; 3 Political agency and accountability; 4 Political agency and public finance (with Michael Smart); 5 Final Comments; References; Index

Sommario/riassunto

Mainstream policy economics now pays more attention to the delivery of policy outcomes and how incentives and institutional change shape the effectiveness of government. But should these issues be studied against a background of purely self-interested public servants? There is plenty of evidence that many citizens are publicly spirited. Can their motivation be harnessed in the public interest? These lectures review how economic thought on these issues has evolved. - ;What is good government? Why do some governments fail? How do you implement political accountability in practice? What incentive