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Autore	Besley Timothy
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Sommario/riassunto	Mainstream policy economics now pays more attention to the delivery of policy outcomes and how incentives and institutional change shape the effectiveness of government. But should these issues be studied against a background of purely self-interested public servants? There is plenty of evidence that many citizens are publicly spirited. Can their motivation be harnessed in the public interest? These lectures review how economic thought on these issues has evolved. - ;What is good government? Why do some governments fail? How do you implement political accountability in practice? What incentive