The reflexive nature of consciousness / / Greg Janzen

• Autore: Janzen Greg
• Pubblicazione: Amsterdam ; ; Philadelphia, : John Benjamins Pub. Co., c2008
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (197 p.)
• Disciplina: 126
• Soggetto topico: Consciousness; Phenomenology; Self-consciousness (Awareness); Self
• Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. [173]-182) and indexes.
• Nota di contenuto: Introduction -- Conscious states, reflexivity, and phenomenal character -- Some remarks on methodology -- Some semantics of "consciousness" -- Preamble -- Creature consciousness : transitive and intransitive -- State consciousness -- Unconscious mental states -- Self-consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness -- A formula for state consciousness -- Nagel's what-it-is-like formula -- Putative counterexamples -- Non-conscious phenomenality? -- Summary -- Consciousness and self-awareness -- Preamble -- A gloss on intentionality -- The transitivity principle -- Two positive arguments for the transitivity principle -- Higher-orderism -- Preamble -- The higher-order theory of consciousness -- A "one-state" alternative -- Preamble -- The Brentanian model -- Objections and replies -- Representationalism -- Preamble -- The representational theory of phenomenal character -- The nature of phenomenal character -- Preamble -- Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness -- Some brief remarks on privacy -- Conclusion.
• Sommario/riassunto: Combining phenomenological insights from Brentano and Sartre, but also drawing on recent work on consciousness by analytic philosophers, this book defends the view that conscious states are reflexive, and necessarily so, i.e., that they have a built-in, "implicit" awareness of their own occurrence, such that the subject of a conscious state has an immediate, non-objectual acquaintance with it. As part of this investigation, the book also explores the relationship between reflexivity and the phenomenal, or "what-it-is-like," dimension of conscious experience, defending the innovative thesis that phenomenal character is constituted by the implicit self-awareness built into every conscious state. This account stands in marked contrast to most influential extant theories of phenomenal character, including qualia theories, according to which phenomenal character is a matter of having phenomenal sensations, and representationalism, according to which phenomenal character is constituted by representational content. (Series A).
• Titolo autorizzato: The reflexive nature of consciousness
• ISBN: 1-282-15234-3; 9786612152344; 90-272-9168-3
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910826372003321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: Advances in consciousness research ; ; v. 72.