The reflexive nature of consciousness / / Greg Janzen

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910826372003321
• Autore: Janzen Greg
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Amsterdam ; ; Philadelphia, : John Benjamins Pub. Co., c2008
• ISBN: 1-282-15234-3; 9786612152344; 90-272-9168-3
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (197 p.)
• Collana: Advances in consciousness research, , 1381-589X ; ; v. 72
• Disciplina: 126
• Soggetti: Consciousness; Phenomenology; Self-consciousness (Awareness); Self
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. [173]-182) and indexes.
• Nota di contenuto: Introduction -- Conscious states, reflexivity, and phenomenal character -- Some remarks on methodology -- Some semantics of "consciousness" -- Preamble -- Creature consciousness : transitive and intransitive -- State consciousness -- Unconscious mental states -- Self-consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness -- A formula for state consciousness -- Nagel's what-it-is-like formula -- Putative counterexamples -- Non-conscious phenomenality? -- Summary -- Consciousness and self-awareness -- Preamble -- A gloss on intentionality -- The transitivity principle -- Two positive arguments for the transitivity principle -- Higher-orderism -- Preamble -- The higher-order theory of consciousness -- A "one-state" alternative -- Preamble -- The Brentanian model -- Objections and replies -- Representationalism -- Preamble -- The representational theory of phenomenal character -- The nature of phenomenal character -- Preamble -- Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness -- Some brief remarks on privacy -- Conclusion.
• Sommario/riassunto: Combining phenomenological insights from Brentano and Sartre, but also drawing on recent work on consciousness by analytic philosophers, this book defends the view that conscious states are ; reflexive, and necessarily so, i.e., that they have a built-in, "implicit" awareness of their own occurrence, such that the subject of a conscious state has an immediate, non-objectual acquaintance with it. As part of this investigation, the book also explores the relationship between reflexivity and the phenomenal, or "what-it-is-like," dimension of conscious experience, defending the innovative thesis that phenomenal character is constituted by the implicit self-awareness built into every conscious state. This account stands in marked contrast to most influential extant theories of phenomenal character, including qualia theories, according to which phenomenal character is a matter of having phenomenal sensations, and representationalism, according to which phenomenal character is constituted by representational content. (Series A).