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100   $a20071105d2008      uy         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurcn|||||||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 14$aThe reflexive nature of consciousness /$fGreg Janzen
210   $aAmsterdam ;$aPhiladelphia $cJohn Benjamins Pub. Co.$dc2008
215   $a1 online resource (197 p.) 
225 1 $aAdvances in consciousness research,$x1381-589X ;$vv. 72
300   $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
311   $a90-272-5208-4 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [173]-182) and indexes.
327   $aIntroduction -- Conscious states, reflexivity, and phenomenal character -- Some remarks on methodology -- Some semantics of "consciousness" -- Preamble -- Creature consciousness : transitive and intransitive -- State consciousness -- Unconscious mental states -- Self-consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness -- A formula for state consciousness -- Nagel's what-it-is-like formula -- Putative counterexamples -- Non-conscious phenomenality? -- Summary -- Consciousness and self-awareness -- Preamble -- A gloss on intentionality -- The transitivity principle -- Two positive arguments for the transitivity principle -- Higher-orderism -- Preamble -- The higher-order theory of consciousness -- A "one-state" alternative -- Preamble -- The Brentanian model -- Objections and replies -- Representationalism -- Preamble -- The representational theory of phenomenal character -- The nature of phenomenal character -- Preamble -- Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness -- Some brief remarks on privacy -- Conclusion.
330   $aCombining phenomenological insights from Brentano and Sartre, but also drawing on recent work on consciousness by analytic philosophers, this book defends the view that conscious states are reflexive, and necessarily so, i.e., that they have a built-in, "implicit" awareness of their own occurrence, such that the subject of a conscious state has an immediate, non-objectual acquaintance with it. As part of this investigation, the book also explores the relationship between reflexivity and the phenomenal, or "what-it-is-like," dimension of conscious experience, defending the innovative thesis that phenomenal character is constituted by the implicit self-awareness built into every conscious state. This account stands in marked contrast to most influential extant theories of phenomenal character, including qualia theories, according to which phenomenal character is a matter of having phenomenal sensations, and representationalism, according to which phenomenal character is constituted by representational content. (Series A).
410  0$aAdvances in consciousness research ;$vv. 72.
606   $aConsciousness
606   $aPhenomenology
606   $aSelf-consciousness (Awareness)
606   $aSelf
615  0$aConsciousness.
615  0$aPhenomenology.
615  0$aSelf-consciousness (Awareness)
615  0$aSelf.
676   $a126
700   $aJanzen$b Greg$01692600
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910826372003321
996   $aThe reflexive nature of consciousness$94069813
997   $aUNINA