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Autore: |
Laeven Luc
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Titolo: |
The Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises / / Luc Laeven, Fabian Valencia
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Pubblicazione: | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008 |
Edizione: | 1st ed. |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (45 pages) : illustrations, tables |
Disciplina: | 332.1 |
Soggetto topico: | Bank failures |
Financial crises | |
Moral hazard | |
Deposit insurance | |
Banks and Banking | |
Exports and Imports | |
Finance: General | |
Financial Risk Management | |
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation | |
Portfolio Choice | |
Investment Decisions | |
Banks | |
Depository Institutions | |
Micro Finance Institutions | |
Mortgages | |
International Investment | |
Long-term Capital Movements | |
Economic & financial crises & disasters | |
Finance | |
Banking | |
International economics | |
Blanket guarantee | |
Liquidity | |
Bank resolution | |
Foreign liabilities | |
Crisis management | |
Economics | |
Banks and banking | |
Investments, Foreign | |
Soggetto geografico: | Turkey |
Altri autori: |
ValenciaFabian
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Note generali: | Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph |
Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references. |
Nota di contenuto: | Intro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Country Experiences -- III. Effectiveness of Blanket Guarantees -- A. Empirical Analysis -- IV. The Costs of Using Blanket Guarantees -- V. Policy Implications -- VI. Conclusions -- Tables -- 1. Selected Blanket Guarantee Episodes -- 2. Selected Bank-Specific Guarantee Announcements -- 3. Impact of Blanket Guarantees on Liquidity Support -- 4. Short-Term and Medium-Term Effects of Guarantees on Liquidity Support -- 5. Impact of Blanket Guarantees on Foreign Liabilities -- 6. Short-Term and Medium-Term Effect of Guarantees on Foreign Liabilities -- 7. Blanket Guarantee and Extensive Liquidity Support -- 8. Blanket Guarantees, Crisis Intensity, and Fiscal Costs -- A1. Sequence of Events in Selected Crisis Episodes -- A2. IMF Programs and Bank Restructuring Policies -- Figures -- 1. Effectiveness of Depositors' Guarantees in Selected Countries -- 2. Fiscal Costs and Blanket Guarantees -- 3. Crisis Intensity and Blanket Guarantees -- References. |
Sommario/riassunto: | In episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible. However, guarantee could add substantial fiscal costs to bank restructuring programs and may increase moral hazard going forward. Using a sample of 42 episodes of banking crises, this paper finds that blanket guarantees are successful in reducing liquidity pressures on banks arising from deposit withdrawals. However, banks' foreign liabilities appear virtually irresponsive to blanket guarantees. Furthermore, guarantees tend to be fiscally costly, though this positive association arises in large part because guarantees tend to be employed in conjunction with extensive liquidity support and when crises are severe. |
Titolo autorizzato: | The Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises ![]() |
ISBN: | 1-4623-9312-8 |
1-282-84201-3 | |
1-4518-7108-2 | |
1-4527-4503-X | |
9786612842016 | |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910816916003321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
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