05788oam 22012494 450 991081691600332120240402023456.01-4623-9312-81-282-84201-31-4518-7108-21-4527-4503-X9786612842016(CKB)3170000000055145(SSID)ssj0001488770(PQKBManifestationID)11995298(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001488770(PQKBWorkID)11463816(PQKB)10255187(OCoLC)460638675(IMF)WPIEE2008250(MiAaPQ)EBC1586707(EXLCZ)99317000000005514520020129d2008 uf 0engurcnu||||||||txtccrThe Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises /Luc Laeven, Fabian Valencia1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2008.1 online resource (45 pages) illustrations, tablesIMF Working PapersIMF working paper ;WP/08/250Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph1-4519-1561-6 Includes bibliographical references.Intro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Country Experiences -- III. Effectiveness of Blanket Guarantees -- A. Empirical Analysis -- IV. The Costs of Using Blanket Guarantees -- V. Policy Implications -- VI. Conclusions -- Tables -- 1. Selected Blanket Guarantee Episodes -- 2. Selected Bank-Specific Guarantee Announcements -- 3. Impact of Blanket Guarantees on Liquidity Support -- 4. Short-Term and Medium-Term Effects of Guarantees on Liquidity Support -- 5. Impact of Blanket Guarantees on Foreign Liabilities -- 6. Short-Term and Medium-Term Effect of Guarantees on Foreign Liabilities -- 7. Blanket Guarantee and Extensive Liquidity Support -- 8. Blanket Guarantees, Crisis Intensity, and Fiscal Costs -- A1. Sequence of Events in Selected Crisis Episodes -- A2. IMF Programs and Bank Restructuring Policies -- Figures -- 1. Effectiveness of Depositors' Guarantees in Selected Countries -- 2. Fiscal Costs and Blanket Guarantees -- 3. Crisis Intensity and Blanket Guarantees -- References.In episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible. However, guarantee could add substantial fiscal costs to bank restructuring programs and may increase moral hazard going forward. Using a sample of 42 episodes of banking crises, this paper finds that blanket guarantees are successful in reducing liquidity pressures on banks arising from deposit withdrawals. However, banks' foreign liabilities appear virtually irresponsive to blanket guarantees. Furthermore, guarantees tend to be fiscally costly, though this positive association arises in large part because guarantees tend to be employed in conjunction with extensive liquidity support and when crises are severe.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2008/250Bank failuresFinancial crisesMoral hazardDeposit insuranceBanks and BankingimfExports and ImportsimfFinance: GeneralimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationimfPortfolio ChoiceimfInvestment DecisionsimfBanksimfDepository InstitutionsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfInternational InvestmentimfLong-term Capital MovementsimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfFinanceimfBankingimfInternational economicsimfBlanket guaranteeimfLiquidityimfBank resolutionimfForeign liabilitiesimfCrisis managementimfEconomicsimfBanks and bankingimfInvestments, ForeignimfTurkeyimfBank failures.Financial crises.Moral hazard.Deposit insurance.Banks and BankingExports and ImportsFinance: GeneralFinancial Risk ManagementFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationPortfolio ChoiceInvestment DecisionsBanksDepository InstitutionsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesInternational InvestmentLong-term Capital MovementsEconomic & financial crises & disastersFinanceBankingInternational economicsBlanket guaranteeLiquidityBank resolutionForeign liabilitiesCrisis managementEconomicsBanks and bankingInvestments, Foreign332.1Laeven Luc1593549Valencia Fabian1631788DcWaIMFBOOK9910816916003321The Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises4058504UNINA