1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910816916003321

Autore

Laeven Luc

Titolo

The Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises / / Luc Laeven, Fabian Valencia

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008

ISBN

1-4623-9312-8

1-282-84201-3

1-4518-7108-2

1-4527-4503-X

9786612842016

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (45 pages) : illustrations, tables

Collana

IMF Working Papers

IMF working paper ; ; WP/08/250

Altri autori (Persone)

ValenciaFabian

Disciplina

332.1

Soggetti

Bank failures

Financial crises

Moral hazard

Deposit insurance

Banks and Banking

Exports and Imports

Finance: General

Financial Risk Management

Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation

Portfolio Choice

Investment Decisions

Banks

Depository Institutions

Micro Finance Institutions

Mortgages

International Investment

Long-term Capital Movements

Economic & financial crises & disasters

Finance

Banking

International economics

Blanket guarantee

Liquidity

Bank resolution

Foreign liabilities



Crisis management

Economics

Banks and banking

Investments, Foreign

Turkey

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

Intro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Country Experiences -- III. Effectiveness of Blanket Guarantees -- A. Empirical Analysis -- IV. The Costs of Using Blanket Guarantees -- V. Policy Implications -- VI. Conclusions -- Tables -- 1. Selected Blanket Guarantee Episodes -- 2. Selected Bank-Specific Guarantee Announcements -- 3. Impact of Blanket Guarantees on Liquidity Support -- 4. Short-Term and Medium-Term Effects of Guarantees on Liquidity Support -- 5. Impact of Blanket Guarantees on Foreign Liabilities -- 6. Short-Term and Medium-Term Effect of Guarantees on Foreign Liabilities -- 7. Blanket Guarantee and Extensive Liquidity Support -- 8. Blanket Guarantees, Crisis Intensity, and Fiscal Costs -- A1. Sequence of Events in Selected Crisis Episodes -- A2. IMF Programs and Bank Restructuring Policies -- Figures -- 1. Effectiveness of Depositors' Guarantees in Selected Countries -- 2. Fiscal Costs and Blanket Guarantees -- 3. Crisis Intensity and Blanket Guarantees -- References.

Sommario/riassunto

In episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible. However, guarantee could add substantial fiscal costs to bank restructuring programs and may increase moral hazard going forward. Using a sample of 42 episodes of banking crises, this paper finds that blanket guarantees are successful in reducing liquidity pressures on banks arising from deposit withdrawals. However, banks' foreign liabilities appear virtually irresponsive to blanket guarantees. Furthermore, guarantees tend to be fiscally costly, though this positive association arises in large part because guarantees tend to be employed in conjunction with extensive liquidity support and when crises are severe.