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More than you wanted to know : the failure of mandated disclosure / / Omri Ben-Shahar, Carl E. Schneider



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Autore: Ben-Shahar Omri Visualizza persona
Titolo: More than you wanted to know : the failure of mandated disclosure / / Omri Ben-Shahar, Carl E. Schneider Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Princeton, New Jersey : , : Princeton University Press, , 2014
©2014
Edizione: Course Book
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (244 p.)
Disciplina: 346.7302/1
Soggetto topico: Disclosure of information - Law and legislation - United States
Consumer protection - Law and legislation - United States
Decision making - United States
Soggetto non controllato: Miranda
accumulation problem
agents
aggregators
autonomy
behavioral economics
complexity
conflict of interest
consultants
consumer law
consumers
contracts
decision aversion
decisions
defaults
disclosers
disclosurism
disclosurite psychology
disclosurites
discretion
doctors
empirical studies
false assumptions
financial disclosure
financial literacy
fine print
free market
health literacy
iTunes
illiteracy
inequality
information disclosure
information
informed consent
informed decisions
innumeracy
insurance
intermediaries
laboratory experiments
lawmakers
lawmaking
lenders
mandated disclosure
markets
medical treatment
mortgages
numeracy
opt out
overload problem
overload
police
politics
privacy
prostate cancer
quantity question
rationality
readers
reading levels
reasoning
regulation
regulators
regulatory method
rules
sector literacy
simplification
social practice
social psychology
Classificazione: PU 5330
Persona (resp. second.): SchneiderCarl E. <1948->
Note generali: Includes index.
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (pages 197-223) and index.
Nota di contenuto: Front matter -- Contents -- Preface -- Part I. The Ubiquity of Mandated Disclosure -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Complex Decisions, Complex Disclosures -- 3. The Failure of Mandated Disclosure -- Part II. Why Disclosures Fail -- 4. "Whatever": The Psychology of Mandated Disclosure -- 5. Reading Disclosures -- 6. The Quantity Question -- 7. From Disclosure to Decision -- Part III. Can Mandated Disclosure Be Saved? -- 8. Make It Simple? -- 9. The Politics of Disclosure -- 10. Producing Disclosures -- 11. At Worst, Harmless? -- 12. Conclusion: Beyond Disclosurism -- Notes -- Index
Sommario/riassunto: Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosure-requiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is the iTunes terms you assent to, the doctor's consent form you sign, the pile of papers you get with your mortgage. Reading the terms, the form, and the papers is supposed to equip you to choose your purchase, your treatment, and your loan well. More Than You Wanted to Know surveys the evidence and finds that mandated disclosure rarely works. But how could it? Who reads these disclosures? Who understands them? Who uses them to make better choices? Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider put the regulatory problem in human terms. Most people find disclosures complex, obscure, and dull. Most people make choices by stripping information away, not layering it on. Most people find they can safely ignore most disclosures and that they lack the literacy to analyze them anyway. And so many disclosures are mandated that nobody could heed them all. Nor can all this be changed by simpler forms in plainer English, since complex things cannot be made simple by better writing. Furthermore, disclosure is a lawmakers' panacea, so they keep issuing new mandates and expanding old ones, often instead of taking on the hard work of writing regulations with bite. Timely and provocative, More Than You Wanted to Know takes on the form of regulation we encounter daily and asks why we must encounter it at all.
Titolo autorizzato: More than you wanted to know  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4008-5038-X
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910787713703321
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